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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the precise links between foreign direct investment (henceforth, FDI) and poverty 
alleviation, where so far there are few studies attempted to analyze empirically this relationship. The 
FDI inflows vary across international borders, therefore FDI reduces poverty only under certain 
circumstances. ―Roll out the red carpet for foreign investors and they will come‖ ; Countries with 
better financial systems, and healthy business environment are able to attract more FDI, exploit it 
more efficiently and reduce poverty. Empirical analysis using panel data of 62 countries, from 1996 to 
2007, shows that FDI appears regularly to be a key source of employment for women in Non OECD 
countries and has a favorable effect on poverty reduction  in the host country if interacted with 
monetary and  nonmonetary variables.  
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Introduction 
Developing countries with large flows of investment are more successful in reducing poverty. The 
PRC and Southeast Asian countries, which have received most of FDI over the last three decades, also 
accounted for the bulk of the decline in poverty over those decades
3
. The basic facts remain : no other 
region
4
 in the world has ever had incomes rise so dramatically and seen so many people move out of 
poverty in such a short time Stiglitz (1998) 
The  role of FDI in the last decade became more important even the political speech often stressed the 
attraction of  FDI as a key component of the claim for development and particularly the fight against 
poverty. Leaders gathered at the International Conference on Financing for Development (ICFD), held 
in Mexico in 2002, characterized FDI as an engine for economic growth and an integral component of 
poverty alleviation. 
Moreover, the advantage of FDI is not only lies in the capital and employment but also in production, 
management expertise, regional and global distribution links, and the fact that FDI less volatile than 
the other types of capital flows. Chuhan, Punam et al (1996) provide empirical support for the 
conventional notion that short-term investment is ―hot money‖ and direct investment is not. 
 Wei, Shang( 2001) finds that FDI is less volatile than international bank loans. Sarno and Taylor 
(1999) argue that FDI is more persistent than other types of flows. Lipsey (2001) shows that FDI was 
relatively stable in the crises affecting Latin America in 1982, Mexico in 1994, and East Asia in 1997, 
given that the poor have suffered disproportionately during currency and financial crises. World Bank 
(1999) states that reliance on FDI helps protect the poor from the impact of volatility in international 
financial markets.  
The empirical literature suggests that the impact of FDI varies across countries, so that FDI reduces 
poverty only under certain circumstances like financial stability, good governance, infrastructure 
development, capacity building, financial market development, financial liberalization, trade volume, 
business environment, transparency, and economic integration ; all above and more promoting 
development and economic growth, eradicating poverty and narrowing the development gap.  
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De Mello (1999)  shows that FDI  inflows depend conditionally on host country characteristics.  
Zhang, K.H. (2001) found that the role of FDI in host economies seems to be sensitive to host 
economic conditions. 
Romer (1993) argues that by transferring technological and business know-how to poor countries, 
foreign firms can improve the ―idea gap‖ between rich and poor countries. The gap between rich and 
poor countries largely comes down from the physical capital and financial assets that generate wealth. 
The implication is clear : A key aspect of economic advancement lies in poorer countries‘ capacity to 
attract more foreign capital Anil Kumar (2007) 
   Table (1)   FDI inflow 
FDI inflow Value (billion dollars)  %  GDP 
1986 1996 2006  1986 1996 2006 
World 86 390 1461  0.6 1.3 3 
Developed economies 71 237 973  0,6 1 2.7 
Developing economies 16 147 434  0.6 2.3 3.6 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
5
 0.7 3.7 38  0.4 1.9 7.6 
COMESA 1 1 18  1 0.7 6.07 
Source : UNCTAD(2009), World Investment Report . FDI inflow comprise capital provided (either directly or through 
other related enterprises) by a foreign direct investor to a FDI enterprise, or capital received by a foreign direct investor 
from a FDI enterprise. FDI includes the three following components: equity capital, reinvested earnings and intra-company 
loans.  Equity capital is the foreign direct investor's purchase of shares of an enterprise in a country other than that of its 
residence.   Reinvested earnings comprise the direct investor's share (in proportion to direct equity participation) of 
earnings not distributed as dividends by affiliates or earnings not remitted to the direct investor. Such retained profits by 
affiliates are reinvested. Intra-company loans or intra-company debt transactions refer to short- or long-term borrowing 
and lending of funds between direct investors (parent enterprises) and affiliate enterprises. 
 
Table (2)  FDI Inward Stock 
     FDI Inward Stock Value (billion dollars)  %  GDP 
1986 1996 2006  1986 1996 2006 
World 1096 3246 12404  8 11 25 
Developed economies 693 2240 8645  6 10 24 
Developing economies 402 988 3364  16 16 28 
Sub-Saharan Africa  19 44 147  12 23 30 
COMESA 11 23 74  11 14 25 
Source : UNCTAD(2009), World Investment Report,  FDI stock is the value of the share of their capital and reserves (including retained 
profits) attributable to the parent enterprise, plus the net indebtedness of affiliates to the parent enterprises 
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Flows of FDI have grown considerably in recent decades. In 1986, the level of FDI inflows stood at 
US$ 86 Billion, and by 2006, it stood at US$ 1461 Billion. FDI flows have increased from 
approximately 0.6% of world GDP at the beginning of the 1980s to a share between 2% and 3%  since 
the end of  millennium (see Table 1). FDI stocks have increased from a level of about 8% of world 
GDP at the beginning of the 1980s to 25% of world GDP in 2006 (see Table 2). 
FDI now represents the largest component of net resource flows to developing countries, surpassing 
official development assistance (ODA), portfolio investments, and bank loans Miyamoto( 2003). 
Under standard neoclassical assumptions (where output is produced by capital and labor), capital is 
predicted to flow from wealthy to poor countries until capital–labor ratios equalize across countries. 
The observed pattern of FDI, with most capital flowing from one wealthy country to another, is thus 
an apparent paradox. Lucas (1990) argues that differences in human capital could explain this 
paradoxical pattern. 
This increase of FDI has had major effects on the social welfare of the citizens of developing host 
countries and poverty alleviation. This paper attempts to examine if the impact of interaction between 
FDI, financial market development and human development on country growth rate  is consistent with 
the hypothesis of conditional convergence. The term convergence illustrates that countries which lag 
behind in economic development may catch up by growing at a rate which is higher than that of the 
more industrialized countries. The conditionality in convergence illustrates that this can occur only if 
such countries satisfy some side conditions i.e. if they level out differences in terms of endowment of 
crucial factors, such as physical capital and all other determinants affecting the residual which 
augments the productivity of labor . 
Barro (1991) shows that poor countries, indeed, grow faster if they are endowed with high levels of 
human capital (proxied by secondary and primary school enrolment). Barro & Sala-i-Martin, (1997) 
emphasized on the role of technology transfers and market integration in growth. Bhargava, Jamison, 
Lau, & Murray (2001) and  Bloom, Canning, & Sevilla,(2004) have demonstrated that population 
health is a robust predictor of growth. Borensztein et al (1998) found that FDI has an exogenous 
positive effect on economic growth.  
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The paper discuses that FDI promotes growth and  growth benefits the poor. Dollar and Kraay (2001) 
showed that the general effects of FDI on growth are indeed essential, that growth tends to lift the 
incomes of the poor proportionately with overall growth. Deininger and Squire (1996) found a strong 
positive relationship between growth and poverty alleviation and Ravallion et al (1996) also share the 
same finding. Roemer and Gugerty (1997) show that on average the poor do benefit from economic 
growth. 
The relationship between FDI and poverty alleviation is complex. This paper expands the focus to the 
factors that influence the impact of FDI on the employment plus the impact of monetary and  
nonmonetary variables on the FDI inflows. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows : Section 2 ―Roll out the red carpet for foreign 
investors and they will come‖ presents stylized facts regarding FDI and its relationship to monetary 
and nonmonetary variables which can attract more FDI to developing countries, this section 
emphasizes the importance of both monetary and nonmonetary variables and the role of FDI inflow 
under certain circumstances ;  Section 3 FDI inflows and employment : A theoretical framework, this 
section focuses on the impact of FDI on employment and poverty reduction ; Section 4  Empirical  
model used in the analysis of FDI inflows and poverty reduction, this section emphasizes the 
econometric analysis using  panel data of 62 countries, from 1996 to 2007, investigating whether  the  
empirical evidence supports the view that FDI has a statistically significant influence on poverty 
reduction if interacted with monetary and nonmonetary variables ; Section 5 conclusion and Section 6 
Details of the data used.  
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2. Analytical framework   
 
“Roll out the red Carpet for foreign investors and they will come” 
 
FDI , Financial Market development and Poverty reduction  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
           Source: Author elaboration (FDI/GDP source UNCTAD(2009), Privet  credit by deposit source IMF’s International Financial Statistics, October 2008 ) 
         Fig. 1. Countries in this plot are the 64 countries (the sample data of this paper) . 
 
 
Fig. 1.  data on FDI and financial development shows the links between financial market development  
(Private credit to deposits)
6
 and FDI inflows, which consider the motivation of this work i.e. countries 
with better developed financial markets are able to absorb more from FDI to promote their economic 
growth  and reduce poverty but the level of financial development is crucial for these positive effects 
to be realized.  
The literature on FDI has advanced several explanations of those links between financial market 
development and FDI inflows which can exert a positive influence through the transfer of new 
technology and spillover efficiency. However, such a positive impact depends on certain 
circumstances. Capital shortage, which leads to increased poverty in developing countries, has been 
frequently related to deficient, unstable financial markets that fail to accumulate and allocate resources 
efficiently,  Stiglitz (1998).  
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In a trade, English capital is instantly at the disposal of persons capable of understanding the new 
opportunities and making good use of them. In countries where there is little money to lend 
enterprising traders are long kept back, because they cannot at once borrow the capital, without which 
skill and knowledge are useless Bagehot ( 1873). 
Schumpeter (1911) argues that monetary institutions are important and money could be a separate 
driving force.  Literature on finance goes hand in hand with that line. It can be argued that reduce 
transaction costs, allocate the capital to the highest returns projects will lead to higher output growth 
and reduce poverty. Gurley and Shaw (1955); Goldsmith (1969) and Hicks (1969) argue that 
development of a financial system is important in catalyzing the economic growth.  McKinnon (1973) 
and Shaw (1973) argue that any increase in the level of financial development, which follows financial 
liberalization, will lead to a higher level of growth.  
Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) and  King and Levine (1993b) show that financial market  
development reduces informational frictions and improves resource allocation more efficiently. 
Hermes et al ( 2003)  shows that FDI plays an important role in contributing to economic growth but 
the level of financial development is crucial for these positive effects to be realized. Alfaro et al. 
(2004) and Choong, et al.(2005) show that better developed financial systems tend to benefit more 
from FDI. Omran, et al (2003) show that domestic financial reforms should precede policies 
promoting FDI . Beck, et al. (2000) suggest that financial systems are important for both productivity 
and development.  Rebecca M., et al (2009 ) examined  the volatility of capital flows (FDI, portfolio 
flows, and other debt flows) following the liberalization of financial market and they found that capital 
flows are responding differently to financial liberalization. Surprisingly, portfolio flows appear to 
show little response to capital liberalization, while FDI flows show significant increases in volatility, 
particularly for the emerging markets. 
James Ang (2009) shows that efficient financial system facilitates FDI to create backward linkages, 
which are beneficial to the local suppliers in the form of improved production efficiency. This implies 
that financial market development plays a crucial role in the host country and its ability to attract FDI 
and absorbs the benefits associated with it, and reduces poverty. Durham (2004) observed that the 
deeper financial systems absorb capital inflows such as FDI.  
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Furthermore, financial markets affect both the financing of investment and day-to-day business 
activities. Wurgler ( 2000) shows that even if financial development does not lead to higher levels of 
investment, it seems to allocate the existing investment better. 
FDI , openness and Poverty reduction. 
What we do learn is that growth generally does benefit the poor as much as everyone else, so that the 
growth enhancing policies of good rule of law, fiscal discipline, and openness to international trade 
should be at the center of successful poverty reduction strategies David Dollar and Aart Kraay  
(2001). 
The literature deduced that the decision of a foreign firm to enter into another market through  FDI 
depends on the degree of  openness of that market, thus openness of an economy contributes to higher 
FDI and, therefore, to higher growth. Balasubramanyam et al ( 1996)  finds that  trade openness 
regime is crucial for acquiring the potential growth impact of FDI. Kawai (1994) also shares the same 
finding. 
De Mello (1996) showed that the causality direction between FDI and growth depends on the recipient 
country‘s trade regime, while Nair-Reichert and Weihold (2001) showed that the direction of causality 
from FDI to growth is highly heterogeneous and the degree of heterogeneity is more intense for more 
open economies. Singh and Jun (1995) find that export orientation is a large attraction for FDI. 
Dees (1998)  showed that degree of openness to the rest of the world seems to be relevant using 11 
countries and 12 years of panel data to identify the determinants of FDI in China. 
FDI and NIPAs
7
 in host country 
Investment promotion agencies (IPA) in host country play a crucial rule in FDI inflows. Loewendahl 
(2001) and  Proksch (2004) show that sector targeting is considered to be best practice by IPA, as it is 
believed that more intense efforts concentrated on few priority sectors are likely to lead to greater FDI 
inflows than less intense across-the-board attempts to attract FDI. Harding and Javorcik  (2007) argue 
that FDI inflows into sectors explicitly targeted by IPAs more than double in the post-targeting period 
relative to the pre-targeting period and non-targeted sectors. Alfaro and Charlton ( 2007) confirm the 
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same finding i.e. sector targeting is correlated with good FDI leading to an increase in the effect of 
FDI on growth . 
FDI , Political and corruption 
Political factors play a very important role in FDI inflows. Schollammer & Nigh (1984) and  Nigh 
(1985) have argued that the presence of a political system hospitable to a foreign capital in terms of 
property rights and civil liberties plays a favorable role for attracting FDI.  Nunnenkamp and Spatz  
(2004) show that the other factors such as rule of law, the degree of corruption, the quality of public 
management, the protection against property rights infringements and discretionary government 
interference are also very important in attracting FDI .  
Mauro (1995) shows that corruption has a negative impact on the level of investment and economic 
growth.  Dutta and Roy (2008) empirically investigate the role of political risk in the association with 
FDI and financial development. Thus, the coexistence of advanced financial markets and political 
stability seems to be necessary to capture and enjoy the benefits of FDI. 
3. FDI inflows and employment : A theoretical framework  
Employment is ideal to measure the impact of FDI on poverty ―many of the poor blame their income 
shortfall on their joblessness‖, this impact can be categorized into direct and indirect effects. 
FDI inflows are accompanied by direct effect on employment opportunities creation, also indirect 
effect, by promoting both forward and backward production linkages with domestic sectors and 
foreign firms, for instance via subcontracting systems between a foreign firm and local subcontractors 
who supply components or semi-finished goods to the foreign firm, additional employment is 
indirectly created and further economic activity is stimulated. 
 Aaron (1999) states that likely FDI was directly responsible for creating 26 million jobs in 1997. 
Estimates of the indirect employment effect of FDI vary widely around a multiplier of 1.6 (i.e. 1.6 
indirect jobs for every one direct job) therefore, it can be argued that the indirect effect of FDI on 
employment and poverty reduction is  higher than direct effect.  
Richard E. Caves (1974)  examined the effect of foreign presence on value added per worker in 
domestic manufacturing sectors in Australia and found evidence of spillover hypothesis. He argued 
that by employing an increasing share of domestic firms, foreign firms were able to reduce the gap 
10 
 
between foreign and domestic value. Rappapor (2000) argues that FDI increases the productivity not 
only in the firms which receive FDI, but potentially in domestic firms.  
Higher FDI inflows lead to higher quality of the labor force and poverty reduction.  Caves (1998) and 
Tybout (2000) show that domestic large firms linked to FDI tend to be more productive, suggesting 
that the impact of the diffusion is likely to be more effective on large firms than smaller ones. Large 
firms usually have better trained workers and infrastructure to absorb transferred technologies and 
other intangible assets than what small firms have. Filer et al (1995) found that foreign-owned firms 
in the Czech Republic spent 4.6 times on hiring and training more than domestic firms. A study 
focusing on Malaysia also showed that foreign-owned firms provide more training to their workers 
than domestic enterprises World Bank (1997). 
Blomstrom and Kokko, (1996)  show that impact of FDI on employment varies significantly across 
industries and countries which is consistent with that FDI reduces poverty only under certain 
circumstances. 
The impact of FDI on poverty alleviation depends on  the nature of employment created by FDI and its 
effect on the society. Workforce employed by foreign firms will depend on the level of education, 
health and sex.  
With respect to health, the World Health Organization‘s Report of the Commission on 
Macroeconomics and Health (CMH, 2001)
8
 asserts : ‗‗A healthy workforce is important when 
attracting foreign direct investment (FDI).‘‘  
Population health is a creator of human capital that raises worker productivity and improve economic 
growth. High levels of healthy human capital in the workforce are likely to make a country more 
attractive to FDI. On the other hand, high rates of worker turnover due to morbidity and mortality can 
raise production costs and discourage  FDI and increase poverty.  Even diseases might also deter FDI 
inflows.  In addition to the importance of health as a consumption good, health can also be viewed as a 
form of human capital that enhances economic performance both at the individual level and at the 
level of the macro economy  Bloom, Canning, & Jamison(2004).  
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http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2001/924154550x.pdf  
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A substantial body of evidence has demonstrated that population health is a robust predictor of growth 
in per capita income Barro (1991) ; Barro & Sala-i-Martin (1995) ; Bhargava, Jamison, Lau, & 
Murray (2001) and Bloom, Canning, & Sevilla (2004). Moreover, countries may benefit with different 
degrees from health. Bhargava et al. (2001) argue that economic growth resulting from health 
improvements is more pronounced in developing countries than in industrial countries. 
Improving the population health can also reduce poverty through indirect mechanisms ; for example, 
improved health can increase the return to education and worker experience. Healthier children have 
enhanced cognitive function and higher school attendance, allowing them to become better educated, 
and higher earning adults  Bhargava (2001) and  Bloom (2005). 
Marcella Alsan et al ( 2006) argue that a one-year improvement in life expectancy is associated with a 
9% increase in gross FDI inflows to low- and middle-income countries, and this result seems fairly 
robust. These findings are consistent with the view that health is an integral component of human 
capital for developing countries and suggest that the payoff to improved population health is also 
likely to include an elevated rate of FDI inflows. 
With respect to the level of education, Noorbakhsh et al (2001) and  Globerman and Shapiro (2002)
9
 
argue that education does have a positive and significant impact on FDI and its effect has been 
increasing over time.   Zhang and Markusen (1999) present a model where the availability  of skilled 
and educational level of  labour in the host country affects the volume of FDI inflows  
With respect to sex, there are some literature  deduced that FDI appears regularly to be a key source of 
employment for women in developing countries. With this, Jenkins and Thomas  (2002) stress that the 
implications for poverty alleviation are important.  Cotton and Ramachandran ( 2001) give the reason 
for this, based on their research, which has shown that the earnings of women are most often allocated 
to improving the health and nutritional well-being of their children, and any increase of women‘s 
employment and/or increases of their wages are likely to improve the quality of life in households in 
which women work. This goes hand in hand with  Barro-Becker (1989) and  Becker, Murphy and 
Tamura (1990).  
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4. Data and  Empirical  Analysis 
4.1 Data 
In this section, the data used in the empirical analysis are described. Prior research was hampered by 
the lack of consistent cross-country data, and was thus limited to small samples of countries. On the 
basis of the availability of data, a balanced panel data for 62 countries
10
 over the period 1996-2007 
was constructed.  The countries chosen for the empirical work are comprised of samples from the low, 
upper middle-income and high income (OECD) categories.  
The measure for FDI is net FDI inflows as a percent of GDP, FDI is defined as the net inflows of 
investment to acquire a lasting  management interest (10% or more of voting stock) in an enterprise 
operating in an economy other than that of the investor. It is the sum of equity capital, reinvestment of 
earnings, long-term capital and short-term capital as shown in the balance of payments. FDI inflows 
with a negative sign indicate that at least one of the three components of FDI is negative and not offset 
by positive amounts of the remaining components. These are called reverse investment or 
disinvestment. The data are from United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 
2009 FDI database. 
Education index is used to capture the human capital development. It is measured by the adult literacy 
rate (with two-thirds weighting) and the combined primary, secondary, and tertiary gross enrollment 
ratio (with one-third weighting). The adult literacy rate gives an indication of the ability to read and 
write, while the GER gives an indication of the level of education from kindergarten to postgraduate 
education. The data source is (UN) Human Development Reports from 1996 to 2008.
11
 
(UNDP) 
 Regarding the measure of  financial market development,  Thorsten Beck, Aslı Demirgüç-Kunt, and 
Ross Levine (1999) have constructed a database on Financial Development and Structure which 
contains many variables.  One of these variables is bank credit to bank deposits (henceforth, BCBD).  
This is used as an approximate measure of the liquidity constraint. BCBD shows the percentage of 
deposits that is tied up in loans. Thus, this variable  provides a measure for the overall size of the 
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financial sector without distinguishing between different financial institutions. Data here come from 
World Bank Financial Structure Database.
12
 
Economic growth is measured as the annual percentage growth rate per capita of real gross domestic 
product (GDP)  which considers a good proxy for welfare of a country. The data are obtained from 
World Development Indicators (WDI) (World Bank). 
This paper employs the aggregate worldwide governance indicators made available by the World 
Bank
13
 (political stability, government effectiveness, and control of corruption). The details of the 
construction of these measures are to be found in Kaufmann et al. (2005). This is one of the most 
comprehensive compilations of data on governance currently available. 
This paper uses the annual inflation rate since literature argued that it can impact the stability of the 
banking sector Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) and Davis and Karim (2008). The 
government‘s ability to control inflation is expected to reduce investment risks and consequently, to 
increase FDI inflow.  Inflation is also a measure of economic stability, therefore we expect a negative 
coefficient.  Source : World Development Indicators. 
To capture openness to international trade, this study uses the ratio of the sum of exports plus imports 
to total output (GDP). The relation between FDI and the degree of openness of a country proxies the 
liberalization of the trade regime in the host country.  Data come from Penn World Table 
14
 and  the 
population growth data are obtained from World Development Indicators  (World Bank). 
4.2 Empirical  analysis.  
Panel data unit root test , FDI and growth rate.  
Following the hypothesis that FDI generates significant externalities and spillovers in growth and 
poverty alleviation as suggested above, panel data unit root tests provide a preliminary test of that 
linearity hypothesis, so far the greater the accumulation of inputs (FDI inflows), the greater the growth 
rate of output.  In other words, if a country growth rate exhibits a little persistent change over time, so 
should its determinates, or there persistent be offsetting, for instance, if FDI has a statistically 
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significant influence on growth, this should lead to that reality ; an increase in FDI inflows tends to an 
increase in growth rate and poverty reduction.  
As for as empirical validation is concerned, the impact of FDI on growth is estimated  using panel data 
analysis for a sample of 62 countries in the periods 1996-2007. The countries in my sample classified 
by income level  (low, middle, upper middle , OECD and non OECD) and by regions (Sub-Saharan 
Africa, Europe & Central Asia, East Asia & Pacific).  Section 5  provides further data sources as well 
as the definitions of the variables used in this paper.  
In this study, unit root tests are used to examine whether my variables of interest (growth rate per 
capita and FDI as a percentage of GDP) are stationary.  This study performed two different tests ; 
Levin  and Lin (LL) Test (2002)
15
, Im, Pesaran and Shin (IPS) Test (1997) which are the most widely 
used methods for panel data unit root tests in the literature.  
Table (3) Combined results of the panel unit root tests . 
  Growth per Capita  FDI/GDP 
LLC IPS  LLC IPS 
Paper Sample   (62) 
-7.183 
 (0.000)*** 
-4.508 
(0.000)*** 
 -5.434 
(0.000)*** 
-3.914 
(0.000)*** 
High income level :OECD  (14) 
-2.647 
 (0.004)** 
-1.686  
(0.04)* 
 -2.410  
(0.008)** 
-1.891 
(0.02)* 
Non OECD  (48) 
-8.594  
(0.000)*** 
-5.801 
(0.000)*** 
 -4.876 
(0.000)*** 
-3.553 
(0.000)*** 
 Low income level (19) 
-7.872  
(0.000)*** 
-5.218 
(0.000)*** 
 -2.952  
(0.001)** 
-2.950 
(0.002)** 
Lower Middle income. (14) 
-2.759  
(0.002)** 
-1.707  
(0.04)* 
 -1.749  
(0.04) * 
-1.496 
(0.06) † 
Upper Middle income (15) 
-5.109  
(0.000)*** 
-3.816 
(0.000)*** 
 -3.257  
(0.000)*** 
-1.797  
(0.03) * 
East Asia & Pacific (5) 
-5.359  
(0.000)*** 
-4.140 
(0.000)*** 
 -3.703 
(0.000)*** 
-3.295 
(0.000)*** 
Europe & Central Asia (7) 
-3.132  
(0.000)*** 
-2.242 
 (0.01)* 
 -2.422  
(0.007)** 
-1.030 
(0.152) 
Latin America & Caribbean (17) 
-4.720  
(0.000)*** 
-2.869 
(0.002)** 
 -2.466  
(0.001)** 
-1.782  
(0.03) * 
Sub-Saharan Africa (19) 
-6.468  
(0.000)*** 
-3.429 
(0.000)*** 
 -2.561  
(0.001)** 
-1.893  
(0.02) * 
         † if p < 0.10, * if p < 0.05; ** if p < 0.01; *** if p < 0.001. 
 
The results presented in Table 3 show that the test statistics are all negative and greater than the 
critical values in absolute term. This confirms my believe, of considerable interest, since they indicate 
                                                          
15
 In econometrics literature, the Levin-Lin (LL) tests has been extensively used during the last few years 
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that regardless of the applied unit root test for a chosen deterministic specification, or income level or 
geographical location, the growth rate and FDI as a percentage of GDP are stationary and that the 
regression results are not spurious.  Therefore, I reject the null hypothesis for all, except the results 
obtained by using the IPS test for FDI inflow to Europe & Central Asia region (Albania, Georgia, 
Croatia, Kazakhstan , Latvia, Lava and Poland).  
Panel data Estimates.  
The fixed and random effects panel methods are based on the stationary assumption. Since the LLC 
and IPS tests are performed and they indicated that the growth rate and FDI are stationary, the 
conventional fixed and random effects panel methods are adequate here. Before proceeding to the 
empirical results, Hausman-test was conducted to choose the appropriate model (RE or FE-model).  
The test produces high statistics that lead to the rejection of the fixed effect model.  
 The presence of homoskedastic
16
 could be a restrictive assumption for panels, where the cross-
sectional units may be of various sizes and as a result may exhibit different variation. Given that  FDI 
inflows varies across international borders, and we are dealing with different size countries, one 
should expect the  heteroskedastic existences. This study uses the Feasible Generalized-Least-Squares 
(GLS) estimators developed for panel data, accounting for homoskedastic with no autocorrelation and  
heteroskedastic with cross-sectional correlation, and also cross-sectional correlation alone with 
common AR(1) process in error terms.  
The purpose of the empirical analysis is to examine financial markets (monetary variable) and human 
development (nonmonetary variable) channels through which FDI may be beneficial for growth and 
poverty reduction. As a starting exercise considers the following three models assuming the Presence 
of homoskedastic : 
                                              
                  
                                                             
                            
  
                  
                                                          
16 The standard error component model assumes that the regression disturbances are homoskedastic with constant  variance across time 
and individuals. In contrast, the regression disturbance is called heteroskedastic  if it has different variance across time and individuals. 
(1) 
(2) 
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Table 4 presents results based on regressions (1), (2) and (3)  under the assumption of  homoskedastic  
existence to examine the role of FDI on growth through financial markets and HDI Channels. The 
paper interacts FDI with financial markets and uses this as an independent variable  in regression (2) 
to test the significance of financial markets  alone in enhancing the positive externalities associated 
with FDI flows.  In regression (3), the paper interacts FDI with financial markets  and education Index 
and uses this as an independent variable in the regression to test for the significance of financial 
markets  and education index  in enhancing the positive externalities associated with FDI flows. The 
latter variables were included in the regression independently in order to ensure that the interaction 
term does not proxy for FDI or the level of development of financial markets or the level of human 
development . 
As shown in Table 4, the interaction term turns out to be positive in all and significant in all columns. 
Except for OECD countries, Colum(5), the interaction term turns out to be positive but not significant. 
My interpretation is that the impact of FDI on  growth is expected to be stronger in the recipient 
economy than the country of origin of FDI.  If the advanced economies in the OECD countries are the 
main net exporters of FDI, then the impact should be smaller in those countries than elsewhere. 
 For each regression, a different country sample was used which may differ from one  regression to 
another. Column (1) uses a sample of  62 countries (all countries for which I have data), column (2) 
uses a sample of 48 non OECD countries, column (3) uses a sample of 19 low income level countries, 
column (4) uses a sample of 15 upper middle income countries and column (5) uses a sample of 14 
OECD countries.  
The main result is that the interaction terms are positive and  significant at the 10 % level for the entire 
range of countries‘ groups used. Moreover, the first interaction term (FDI X Financial market) for  low 
income countries (poor countries) is significant at the 1% while it is significant at 10% for upper 
middle income countries and positive but not significant for OECD countries (FDI exporter), also we 
have the same results for the second interaction term.  
(3) 
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Interestingly, the coefficient of FDI is positive and significant and displays considerable variation 
within the countries‘ group.  Low income countries (Poor Countries) have the highest coefficients for 
all the models.  In contrast, OECD countries (Rich countries) have the lowest coefficients. 
The results are consistent with the hypothesis of  conditional convergence.  Countries with low income 
level may catch up by growing at a rate which is higher than that of the more industrialized countries 
(OECD).  The same results are found by  Barro (1991)  and Barro & Sala-i-Martin (1997).  
Table 4 also reports (I) the joint significance test of financial markets with the interaction term and (II) 
the joint significance test of  education index with the interaction term and (III) the joint significance 
test of FDI with the interaction term. For all samples‘ groups, the tests confirm the importance of  
financial markets, education and FDI.  First, with respect to equation 2, the hypothesis that the 
coefficients of both FDI, and the interaction between FDI and financial markets are zero , is rejected in 
all regressions at the 5 % level for all the entire range of countries‘ groups used.  Also the hypothesis 
that the coefficients of both financial market, and the interaction between FDI and financial markets 
are zero,  cannot be rejected outright at the 5 % level except only in the case of  first column (1)  
which contain all the countries in our sample (62).  Clearly,  the coefficients of the interaction terms in 
this regression  also report the lowest t-statistics. Second, with respect to equation 3, the hypothesis 
that the coefficients of both FDI, and the interaction between FDI, financial  market and education  are 
zero, is rejected for all regressions  at the 5 % level for all the entire range of countries‘ groups used 
and the hypothesis that the coefficients of both financial market, and the interaction between FDI, 
financial market and education are zero, is rejected in all regressions at the 10% level for all the entire 
range of countries‘ groups and finally the hypotheses that  the coefficients of both education , and the 
interaction between FDI, financial market and education  are zero, is rejected in all regressions at the 
10 % level for all the entire range of countries‘ groups. 
Moreover, Table 4 also reports that financial market indicator by itself is insignificant and even 
negative for non OECD countries and low income countries.  On the other hand, there are mixed 
results for the upper middle income and OECD countries. Not surprisingly, the coefficients of the 
interaction terms of OECD sample regressions report the lowest t-statistics compared with the 
counterparts in the other columns.  
18 
 
Table (4) homoskedastic, no autocorrelation FDI and growth  : Dependent variable—per capita growth rate. 
 Model 1 Without Interaction term    Model 2 with Interaction term = FD I   FM  Model 3 with Interaction term = FDI   FM  Edu 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
FDI/GDP 0.163 
(3.93)*** 
0.175 
(3.09)** 
0.210 
(1.93)† 
.170 
(1.72)† 
.086 
(2.32)* 
 .156 
(3.74)*** 
.229 
(3.85)*** 
.411 
(2.61)** 
.157 
(1.62) 
.047 
(0.94) 
 .133 
(3.01)** 
.162 
(2.91)** 
.259 
(2.35)* 
.146 
(1.50) 
.048 
(0.95) 
Interaction term 
__ __ __ __ __ 
 .108 
(1.72)† 
.306 
(2.77)** 
.388 
(1.75)† 
.846 
(2.77)** 
.064 
(1.14) 
 .149 
(1.95)† 
.551 
(3.64)*** 
.697 
(2.05)* 
.973 
(2.82)** 
.064 
(1.10) 
Financial market -0.003 
(-1.09) 
-0.004 
(-1.17) 
-.012 
(-1.62) 
.003 
(0.44) 
-.008 
(-2.32)* 
 -.007 
(-1.97)* 
-.016 
(-2.90)** 
-.025 
(-2.50)* 
-.041 
(-2.28)* 
-.011 
(-2.51)* 
 -.007 
(-2.09)* 
-.019 
(-3.57)*** 
-.024 
(-2.70)** 
-.041 
(-2.32)* 
-.011 
(-2.49)* 
Education 0.015 
(1.70) † 
0.016 
(1.54) 
.037 
(2.29)* 
.190 
(3.29)** 
.108 
(1.83) † 
 .015 
(1.68) † 
.015 
(1.46) 
.034 
(2.08)* 
.135 
(2.25)* 
.112 
(1.91)† 
 .019 
(2.06)* 
.030 
(2.68)** 
.057 
(3.03)** 
.140 
(2.37)* 
.112 
(1.91)† 
Population 
Growth 
-0.828 
(-5.90)*** 
-0.901 
(-5.31)*** 
-.389 
(-0.81) 
-.403 
(-1.60) 
-.377 
(-1.92)† 
 -.846 
(-6.02)*** 
-.892 
(-5.29)*** 
-.395 
(-0.82) 
-.606 
(-2.36)* 
-.414 
(-2.09)* 
 -.846 
(-6.02)*** 
-.860 
(-5.12)*** 
-.205 
(-0.42) 
-.58 
(-2.30)* 
-.412 
(-2.08)* 
Political Stability 
No Violence 
0.007 
(3.08)*** 
0.007 
(2.43)* 
.005 
(1.14) 
.030 
(2.87)** 
.009 
(1.76)† 
 .007 
(3.15)** 
.007 
(2.43)* 
.006 
(1.20) 
.031 
(3.04)** 
.009 
(1.67)† 
 .007 
(3.15)** 
.006 
(2.32)* 
.004 
(0.89) 
.031 
(3.03)** 
.009 
(1.67) † 
Government 
Effectiveness 
0.003 
(0.78) 
0.008 
(1.36) 
.015 
(1.57) 
.012 
(0.81) 
.009 
(1.29) 
 .004 
(0.84) 
.008 
(1.38) 
.015 
(1.57) 
.014 
(1.01) 
.011 
1.44 
 .004 
(0.80) 
.007 
(1.29) 
.016 
(1.65)† 
.013 
(0.93) 
.011 
(1.44) 
Control of 
Corruption 
-0.012 
(-2.72)** 
-0.012 
(-2.20)* 
.001 
(0.17) 
-.027 
(-2.11)* 
-.012 
(-1.87) † 
 -.012 
(-2.79)** 
-.011 
(-2.01)* 
.002 
0.20 
-.028 
(-2.17)* 
-.013 
(-1.97)* 
 -.012 
(-2.85)** 
-.011 
(-2.02)* 
.002 
(0.28) 
-.026 
(-2.08)* 
-.013 
(-1.97)* 
Trade volume 0.008 
(2.58)* 
0.009 
(2.37)* 
-.004 
(-0.50) 
.011 
(1.75)† 
.001 
(0.22) 
 .009 
(2.77)** 
.009 
(2.55)* 
-.003 
(-0.43) 
.012 
(1.98)* 
.002 
(0.47) 
 .009 
(2.80)** 
.009 
(2.56)* 
-.006 
(-0.75) 
.012 
(2.02)* 
.002 
(0.47) 
Inflation -0.018 
(-0.91) 
-.017  
(-0.73) 
-.075 
(-1.91)† 
-.012 
(-0.25) 
-.004 
(-0.08) 
 -.020 
(-1.01) 
-.020 
(-0.86) 
-.082 
(-2.10)* 
-.014 
(-0.28) 
-.003 
(-0.07) 
 -.023 
(-1.12) 
-.029 
(-1.22) 
-.085 
(-2.17)* 
-.021 
(-0.43) 
-.003 
(-0.08) 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa dummy 
0.009 
(2.28)* 
0 .011 
(2.33)* 
.0003 
0.03 
.0314 
(2.19)* 
__ 
 .010 
(2.44)* 
.013 
(2.71)** 
.003 
(0.41) 
.037 
(2.66)** 
__ 
 .010 
(2.49)* 
.015 
(3.02)*** 
.005 
(0.52) 
.038 
(2.70)** 
__ 
No of Obs 744 576 228 180 168  744 576 228 180 168  744 576 228 180 168 
No of countries 62 48 19 15 14  62 48 19 15 14  62 48 19 15 14 
Wald      
( Prob >   ) 
152.38 
(0.000)*** 
128.72 
(0.000)*** 
35.64 
(0.000)*** 
94.60 
(0.000)*** 
29.56 
(0.000)*** 
 155.93 
(0.000)*** 
138.11 
(0.000)*** 
39.19 
(0.000)*** 
106.31 
(0.000)*** 
31.08 
(0.000)*** 
 156.96 
(0.000)*** 
144.91 
(0.000)*** 
40.49 
(0.000)*** 
106.78 
(0.000)*** 
31 
(0.000)*** 
    for FDI 
 ( Prob >   ) 
      18.48 
(0.000)*** 
17.36 
(0.000)*** 
6.86 
(0.03)* 
10.75 
(0.004)** 
6.71 
(0.03)* 
 19.36 
(0.000)*** 
23.00 
(0.000)*** 
8.00 
 (0.01)* 
11.06 
(0.004)** 
6.63 
(0.03)* 
    for FM 
( Prob >   ) 
      4.14  
(0.12) 
9.06 
(0.01)* 
6.28 
(0.04)* 
7.87 
(0.01)* 
6.70 
(0.03)* 
 5.01  
(0.08) † 
14.63 
(0.000)*** 
7.43 
 (0.02)* 
8.18 
(0.01)* 
6.62  
(0.03)* 
    for Edu 
( Prob >   ) 
            6.71  
(0.03)*  
15.64 
(0.000)*** 
9.55 
 (0.008)** 
19.29 
(0.000)*** 
4.61  
(0.09)† 
Notes: All regressions have a constant positive  term. t-values are in parentheses. The financial market variables  refer to log of (  Bank credit / Bank Deposits) . Population growth is the growth rate for the period. the 
inflation is log (1 + inflation rate) for the period. Trade volume is log (average of exports + imports as a share of GDP) Government performance variables (Political Stability No Violence Government Effectiveness 
Control of Corruption), 
† if p < 0.10, * if p < 0.05; ** if p < 0.01; *** if p < 0.001. 
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Heteroskedastic Presence in the Panel data. 
 Assuming homoskedastic disturbances when heteroskedastic is present will still result in 
consistent estimates of the regression coefficients. Therefore,  Modified Wald test for group 
wise heteroskedastic has been conducted to test the heteroskedastic presences  in regression 
(1), (2) and (3). The null is homoskedastic (or constant variance). 
Table( 5)  Modified Wald test  
         H0: sigma(i)^2 = sigma^2 for all I,  † if p < 0.10, * if p < 0.05; ** if p < 0.01; *** if p < 0.001. 
 
Table 5 reports that I reject the null and conclude heteroskedastic, and due to prevailing serial 
correlation in the standard models, I run a GLS estimation accounting for heteroskedastic with  cross-
sectional correlation, and also cross-sectional correlation  with common AR (1) process in error terms.  
Clearly for a sample of 62 countries (all countries for which I have data) and non OECD  (48) 
countries, if I compared the number of all existence observations in my model to the number of 
estimated parameters under FGLS regression, I will find that parameters estimated at least as many 
quantities as I have observations.  Therefore, I would not put great value on the results so I ignored 
this sample group. 
For each regression type, the same countries samples were used.  Column (1) uses a sample of 19 low 
income level countries (Poor countries), column (2) uses a sample of 15 upper middle income 
countries and column (3) uses a sample of 14 OECD countries. 
Table 6 and 7 report that the FGLS estimation accounting for heteroskedastic with cross-sectional 
correlation, and  cross-sectional correlation  with common AR(1) process in error terms, receptively, 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Model (1)      
     
( Prob >   ) 
13473.34 
(0.000)*** 
5014.35 
(0.000)*** 
1084.16 
(0.000)*** 
268.51 
(0.000)*** 
242.32 
(0.000)*** 
Model (2)      
     
( Prob >   ) 
12445.91 
(0.000)*** 
5185.88 
(0.000)*** 
1229.57 
(0.000)*** 
109.45 
(0.000)*** 
252.91 
(0.000)*** 
Model (3)      
     
( Prob >   ) 
13149.56 
(0.000)*** 
4431.79 
(0.000)*** 
1066.36 
(0.000)*** 
119.13 
(0.000)*** 
252.29 
(0.000)*** 
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turned out to be promising results for all investigated models.  As shown in Table 6, both interaction 
terms under heteroskedastic turns out to be positive and significant in all columns. For the first 
interaction term, it is significant at the 10 % level for the entire range of countries‘ groups except 
countries with high income level (FDI Importer). For the second interaction term, it turns out to be 
positive and significant at 10% level for all countries‘ groups. 
Moreover, Table 6  reports that  the coefficients of the interaction term of FDI, financial market 
indicator and education index for low income countries (Poor countries)  report the highest 
coefficients  compared with the counterparts in the other columns. This finding  is consistent with the 
motivation of this work which is  FDI have a favorable effect on growth and poverty reduction  in the 
host country if interacted with monetary and  nonmonetary variables.  Interestingly, the coefficient of 
FDI is positive and significant and displays considerable variation within the countries‘ group and low 
income countries (Poor Countries) have the highest coefficient by increasing 1% of FDI inflow which 
will impact 0.345% increase in growth rate per capita.  In contrast, upper middle income and OECD 
countries (Rich countries ) have the lowest coefficient 0.048. 
Table 6 also reports (I) the joint significance test of financial markets with the interaction term and (II) 
the joint significance test of  education index with the interaction term and (III) the joint significance 
test of FDI with the interaction term. For all samples‘ groups, the tests confirm the importance of  
financial markets, education and FDI.  First, with respect to equation 2, the hypothesis that the 
coefficients of both FDI, and the interaction between FDI and financial markets are zero, is rejected in 
all regressions at the 1 % level for all the entire range of countries‘ groups used also the hypothesis 
that the coefficients of both financial market, and the interaction between FDI and financial markets 
are zero,  cannot be rejected outright at the 1 % level . 
Second, with respect to equation 3, the hypothesis that the coefficients of both FDI, and the interaction 
between FDI, financial  market and education  are zero, is rejected for all regressions  at the 1 % level 
for all the entire range of countries‘ groups used and the hypothesis that the coefficients of both 
financial market, and the interaction between FDI, financial market and education are zero, is rejected 
in all regressions at the 1% level for all the entire range of countries‘ groups and finally the hypotheses 
that the coefficients of both education, and the interaction between FDI, financial market and 
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education are zero, is rejected in all regressions at the 1 % level for all the entire range of countries‘ 
groups. 
Table 6 also reports  that financial market indicator by itself is insignificant  and  negative  for  OECD  
and low income countries and positive for the  upper middle Income countries. Not surprisingly that 
the coefficients of the interaction term (FDI, financial market and education) for  OECD and upper 
middle countries report the lowest t-statistics compared with the counterpart in low income countries 
which goes hand in hand with the claim of this work. FDI have a favorable effect on low income 
countries (Poor) if interacted with monetary and  nonmonetary variables.  
As expected, inflation and growth rate report negative and significant coefficients for all the 
regressions and in the other hand,  political stability and government effectiveness report positive and 
significant coefficients for all the regressions.  
Robustness analysis  
To assess the robustness of these findings,  the domestic investment was controlled.  Tables 8 and 9 
report the results after including domestic investment as an independent variable. Interestingly, the 
coefficient of FDI  is still  positive and significant and displays a considerable variation within the 
countries‘ group. The obtained results lead to  interesting  statements : First, domestic investment 
enters significantly in all the regressions. Second, the coefficients of  FDI  and interaction term for  
OECD and upper middle countries still report the lowest  t-statistics compared with the counterpart in 
low income countries (Poor Countries).  The findings demonstrated that FDI still has a favorable effect 
on low income countries (Poor) if interacted with monetary and  nonmonetary variables even after 
controlling for domestic investment. 
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Table (6) Heteroskedastic with cross-sectional correlation, no autocorrelation FDI and growth  : Dependent variable—per capita growth rate. 
 Model 1 Without Interaction term    Model 2 with Interaction term = FD I   FM  Model 3 with Interaction term = FDI   FM  Edu 
Income Low  Upper middle High(OECD)    Low  Upper middle High(OECD)    Low  Upper middle High(OECD)   
FDI/GDP 0.271 
(5.44)*** 
0.172 
(7.12)*** 
0.087 
(6.07)***   
 0.482 
(7.36)*** 
0.064 
(1.95)† 
0.065 
(4.01)***   
 0.345 
(5.87)*** 
0.042 
(1.39) 
0.048 
(2.92)** 
  
Interaction term 
_____ _____ _____   
 0.434 
(4.26)*** 
0.600 
(6.05)*** 
0.039 
(1.27)   
 1.024 
(3.02)** 
0.812 
(7.01)*** 
0.066 
(1.85)† 
  
Financial market -0.008 
(-1.22) 
0.001 
(0.31) 
-0.006 
(-2.60)**   
 -0.025 
(-3.11)** 
-0.021 
(-3.88)*** 
-0.011 
(-4.93)***   
 -0.025 
(-3.30)** 
-0.026 
(-5.32)*** 
-0.009 
(-3.80)*** 
  
Education 0.044 
(3.94)*** 
0.178 
(10.26)*** 
0.120 
(8.16)***   
 0.041 
(3.97)*** 
0.161 
(7.21)*** 
0.110 
(4.70)***   
 0.071 
(5.99)*** 
0.141 
(5.95)*** 
0.129 
(6.45)*** 
  
Population Growth -0.754 
(-2.91)** 
-0.428 
(-4.57)*** 
-0.379 
(-6.88)***   
 -0.619 
(-2.66)** 
-0.371 
(-3.26)*** 
-0.413 
(-5.01)***   
 -0.477 
(-1.77)† 
-0.487 
(-5.13)*** 
-0.397 
(-7.00)*** 
  
Political Stability No Violence 0.006 
(1.72)† 
0.029 
(10.75)*** 
0.011 
(6.78)***   
 0.006 
(2.01)* 
0.016 
(4.32)*** 
0.009 
(4.38)***   
 0.004 
(1.06) 
0.018 
(5.61)*** 
0.011 
(6.59)*** 
  
Government Effectiveness 0.011 
(1.90)† 
0.016 
(4.31)*** 
0.011 
(4.30)***   
 0.012 
(2.39)* 
0.022 
(4.54)*** 
0.011 
(4.66)***   
 0.013 
(2.26)* 
0.023 
(6.36)*** 
0.012 
(4.50)*** 
  
Control of Corruption 0.007 
(1.34) 
-0.031 
(-6.51)*** 
-0.014 
(-6.28)***   
 0.005 
(1.12) 
-0.028 
(-5.39)*** 
-0.013 
(-7.52)***   
 0.008 
(1.43) 
-0.029 
(-7.16)*** 
-0.015 
(-6.21)*** 
  
Trade volume -0.001 
(-0.10) 
0.010 
(8.56)*** 
0.002 
(0.93)   
 -0.002 
(-0.21) 
0.010 
(5.61)*** 
0.002 
(1.20)   
 -0.003 
(-0.38) 
0.009 
(3.11)*** 
0.003 
(1.63) 
  
Inflation -0.093 
(-5.93)*** 
-0.018 
(-1.34) 
-0.038 
(-1.83)†   
 -0.096 
(-8.28)*** 
-0.012 
(-0.66) 
-0.023 
(-1.26)   
 -0.104 
(-6.84)*** 
-0.014 
(-1.04) 
-0.034 
(-1.52) 
  
Sub-Saharan Africa dummy 0.006 
(0.83) 
_____ _____ 
 
 
 0.008 
(1.31) 
_____ _____ 
 
 
 0.010 
(1.47) 
_____ _____   
No of Obs 228 180 168    228 180 168    228 180 168   
No of countries 19 15 14    19 15 14    19 15 14   
Wald      
( Prob >   ) 
161.91 
(0.000)*** 
1724.27 
(0.000)*** 
620.05 
(0.000)*** 
   270.04 
(0.000)*** 
788.77  
(0.000)*** 
445.56 
(0.000)*** 
   146.66  
(0.000)*** 
841.55 
 (0.000)*** 
606.45 
 (0.000)*** 
  
    for FDI 
 ( Prob >   ) 
      59.90 
(0.000)*** 
43.62  
(0.000)*** 
29.88 
(0.000)*** 
   34.47 
 (0.000)*** 
55.42 
 (0.000)*** 
25.35 
 (0.000)*** 
  
    for FM 
( Prob >   ) 
      18.21 
(0.000)*** 
39.65  
(0.000)*** 
24.28 
(0.000)*** 
   12.99 
 (0.001)** 
51.32 
 (0.000)*** 
14.96 
 (0.000)*** 
  
    for Edu 
( Prob >   ) 
            36.01 
 (0.000)*** 
111.67 
 (0.000)*** 
44.65 
 (0.001)** 
  
Notes: All regressions have a constant term. t-values are in parentheses. The financial market variables  refer to log of (  Bank credit / Bank Deposits) . Education variable refer to Education index (based on the adult literacy rate and the combined 
GER for primary, secondary and tertiary education)The inflation is log (1 + inflation rate). Trade volume is log ( exports + imports as a share of GDP). Government performance variables (Political Stability No Violence Government Effectiveness 
Control of Corruption), 
† if p < 0.10, * if p < 0.05; ** if p < 0.01; *** if p < 0.001. 
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          Table (7) heteroskedastic with cross-sectional correlation, with common AR(1)  FDI and growth  : Dependent variable—per capita growth rate. 
 Model 1 Without Interaction term    Model 2 with Interaction term = FD I   FM  Model 3 with Interaction term = FDI   FM  Edu 
Income Low  Upper middle High(OECD)    Low  Upper middle High(OECD)    Low  Upper middle High(OECD)   
FDI/GDP 0.231 
(4.17)*** 
0.063 
(2.05)* 
0.078 
(4.29)***   
 0.416 
(4.85)*** 
0.020 
(0.51) 
0.063 
(3.05)**   
 0.300 
(4.49)*** 
-0.023 
(-0.68) 
0.065 
(3.12)** 
  
Interaction term 
_____ _____ _____   
 0.373 
(2.70)** 
0.632 
(5.09)*** 
0.031 
(0.70)   
 0.705 
(1.75)† 
0.632 
(4.97)*** 
0.027 
(0.58) 
  
Financial market -0.009 
(-1.16) 
-0.002 
(-0.56) 
-0.002 
(-0.63)   
 -0.024 
(-2.42)* 
-0.032 
(-4.42)*** 
-0.004 
(-1.14)   
 -0.021 
(-2.09)* 
-0.026 
(-4.67)*** 
-0.004 
(-1.07) 
  
Education 0.044 
(2.46)* 
0.173 
(5.80)*** 
0.087 
(3.97)***   
 0.040 
(2.34)* 
0.173 
(5.96)*** 
0.090 
(3.45)**   
 0.062 
(3.26)** 
0.188 
(7.22)*** 
0.090 
(3.44)** 
  
Population Growth -1.525 
(-4.04)*** 
-0.489 
(-5.65)*** 
-0.377 
(-4.61)***   
 -1.350 
(-3.88)*** 
-0.352 
(-2.83)** 
-0.389 
(-4.79)***   
 -1.329 
(-3.48)** 
-0.364 
(-3.17)** 
-0.388 
(-4.78)*** 
  
Political Stability No Violence 0.007 
(1.54) 
0.026 
(5.70)*** 
0.010 
(4.12)***   
 0.008 
(1.79)† 
0.028 
(6.15)*** 
0.010 
(4.06)***   
 0.005 
(1.05) 
0.015 
(3.78)*** 
0.010 
(4.07)** 
  
Government Effectiveness 0.011 
(1.17) 
0.012 
(2.63)** 
0.013 
(3.70)***   
 0.012 
(1.40) 
0.011 
(1.80) † 
0.013 
(3.77)***   
 0.014 
(1.46) 
0.013 
(2.63)** 
0.013 
(3.76)*** 
  
Control of Corruption 0.002 
(0.24) 
-0.022 
(-3.77)*** 
-0.015 
(-4.47)***   
 0.000 
(-0.01) 
-0.024 
(-4.21)*** 
-0.015 
(-4.46)***   
 0.001 
(0.18) 
-0.017 
(-3.33)*** 
-0.015 
(-4.45)*** 
  
Trade volume 0.001 
(0.06) 
0.010 
(4.63)*** 
0.005 
(2.19)*   
 -0.001 
(-0.08) 
0.009 
(2.86)** 
0.005 
(2.34)*   
 -0.002 
(-0.17) 
0.012 
(6.15)*** 
0.005 
(2.30)* 
  
Inflation -0.067 
(-3.73)*** 
-0.073 
(-3.89)*** 
-0.072 
(-2.91)**   
 -0.071 
(-4.59)*** 
-0.075 
(-3.53)*** 
-0.071 
(-2.76)**   
 -0.074 
(-4.12)*** 
-0.100 
(-5.29)*** 
-0.071 
(-2.79)** 
  
Sub-Saharan Africa dummy 0.016 
(1.66)† 
_____ _____ 
 
 
 0.017 
(1.75)† 
_____ _____ 
 
 
 0.018 
(1.88) † 
_____ _____   
No of Obs 228 180 168    228 180 168    228 180 168   
No of countries 19 15 14    19 15 14    19 15 14   
Wald      
( Prob >   ) 
103.88 
(0.000)*** 
440.40 
(0.000)*** 
211.69 
(0.000)*** 
   137.35 
(0.000)*** 
312.78 
(0.000)*** 
219.24 
(0.000)*** 
   100.66 
 (0.000)*** 
340.02 
 (0.000)*** 
218.05 
 (0.000)*** 
  
    for FDI 
 ( Prob >   ) 
      28.21 
(0.000)*** 
27.64 
(0.000)*** 
15.50 
(0.000)*** 
   20.83 
 (0.000)*** 
25.34  
(0.000)*** 
15.68  
(0.000)*** 
  
    for FM 
( Prob >   ) 
      8.06 
(0.01)* 
26.23 
(0.000)*** 
1.46 
(0.482) 
   4.64  
(0.09)† 
27.06  
(0.000)*** 
1.24  
(0.538) 
  
    for Edu 
( Prob >   ) 
            10.80 
 (0.004)** 
92.81  
(0.000)*** 
13.26 
(0.001)** 
  
Notes: All regressions have a constant term. t-values are in parentheses. The financial market variables  refer to log of (  Bank credit / Bank Deposits) . Education variable refer to Education index (based on the adult literacy rate and the combined 
GER for primary, secondary and tertiary education)The inflation is log (1 + inflation rate). Trade volume is log ( exports + imports as a share of GDP). Government performance variables (Political Stability No Violence Government Effectiveness 
Control of Corruption), 
† if p < 0.10, * if p < 0.05; ** if p < 0.01; *** if p < 0.001. 
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Table (8) Heteroskedastic with cross-sectional correlation, no autocorrelation FDI and growth  : Dependent variable—per capita growth rate. 
 Model 1 Without Interaction term    Model 2 with Interaction term = FD I   FM  Model 3 with Interaction term = FDI   FM  Edu 
Income Low  Upper middle High(OECD)    Low  Upper middle High(OECD)    Low  Upper middle High(OECD)   
FDI/GDP 0.149 
(2.72)** 
0.111 
(3.84)*** 
0.052 
(3.69)***   
 0.407 
(4.97)*** 
0.040 
(1.72)† 
0.016 
(1.04)   
 0.233 
(3.69)*** 
0.040 
(1.71)† 
0.017 
(1.10) 
  
Investment/GDP 0.128 
(4.69)*** 
0.339 
(19.31)*** 
0.117 
(7.25)***   
 0.115 
(4.34)*** 
0.278 
(15.82)*** 
0.125 
(6.27)***   
 0.109 
(4.23)*** 
0.276 
(15.21)*** 
0.124 
(6.29)*** 
  
Interaction term 
_____ _____ _____   
 0.470 
(3.76)*** 
0.273 
(2.86)** 
0.066 
(2.45)*   
 0.929 
(2.95)** 
0.299 
(2.81)** 
0.066 
(2.36)* 
  
Financial market -0.016 
(-2.46)* 
-0.023 
(-7.53)*** 
-0.009 
(-4.51)***   
 -0.032 
(-4.16)*** 
-0.025 
(-5.43)*** 
-0.013 
(-5.13)***   
 -0.030 
(-4.18)*** 
-0.025 
(-5.42)*** 
-0.013 
(-5.10)*** 
  
Education 0.032 
(2.13)* 
0.118 
(5.81)*** 
0.071 
(4.68)***   
 0.030 
(2.12)* 
0.094 
(5.31)*** 
0.080 
(4.44)***   
 0.054 
(3.71)*** 
0.095 
(5.31)*** 
0.080 
(4.44)*** 
  
Population Growth -0.717 
(-2.19)* 
-0.533 
(-7.19)*** 
-0.626 
(-10.52)***   
 -0.644 
(-2.08)* 
-0.597 
(-7.45)*** 
-0.663 
(-10.26)***   
 -0.415 
(-1.29) 
-0.595 
(-7.34)*** 
-0.660 
(-10.28)*** 
  
Political Stability No Violence 0.005 
(2.06)* 
0.022 
(6.52)*** 
0.005 
(2.31)*   
 0.006 
(2.09)* 
0.009 
(3.66)*** 
0.004 
(2.03)*   
 0.004 
(1.32) 
0.009 
(3.53)*** 
0.004 
(2.03)* 
  
Government Effectiveness 0.008 
(1.42) 
0.002 
(0.55)*** 
0.010 
(5.08)***   
 0.008 
(1.59) 
0.017 
(4.85)*** 
0.011 
(5.13)***   
 0.012 
(2.13)* 
0.017 
(4.78)*** 
0.011 
(5.14)*** 
  
Control of Corruption 0.005 
(0.94) 
-0.016 
(-4.97)*** 
-0.007 
(-3.69)***   
 0.005 
(0.86) 
-0.022 
(-6.05)*** 
-0.008 
(-3.60)***   
 0.004 
(0.77) 
-0.022 
(-5.91)*** 
-0.008 
(-3.63)*** 
  
Trade volume -0.003 
(-0.48) 
0.003 
(1.00) 
0.004 
(1.71)†   
 -0.003 
(-0.45) 
0.005 
(2.55)* 
0.005 
(1.99)*   
 -0.007 
(-1.05) 
0.005 
(2.61)** 
0.005 
(1.98)* 
  
Inflation -0.109 
(-5.52)*** 
-0.016 
(-0.93) 
-0.082 
(-4.48)***   
 -0.111 
(-5.59)*** 
0.011 
(0.73) 
-0.085 
(-4.00)***   
 -0.112 
(-5.80)*** 
0.011 
(0.68) 
-0.086 
(-4.02)*** 
  
Sub-Saharan Africa dummy 0.004 
(0.58) 
_____ _____ 
 
 
 0.008 
(1.25) 
_____ _____ 
 
 
 0.005 
(0.80) 
_____ _____   
No of Obs 216 168 168    216 168 168    216 168 168   
No of countries 18 14 14    18 14 14    18 14 14   
Wald      
( Prob >   ) 
234.06 
 (0.000)*** 
1763.28  
(0.000)*** 
556.95 
(0.000)*** 
   306.87  
(0.000)*** 
2597.78  
(0.000)*** 
478.12  
(0.000)*** 
   286.01  
(0.000)*** 
2505.80 
 (0.000)*** 
478.25 
 (0.000)*** 
  
    for FDI 
 ( Prob >   ) 
      24.72  
(0.000)*** 
15.30  
(0.000)*** 
9.61  
(0.008)** 
   15.23 
 (0.000)*** 
14.91 
 (0.000)*** 
9.44 
 (0.00)** 
  
    for FM 
( Prob >   ) 
      19.72  
(0.000)*** 
39.98  
(0.000)*** 
26.36  
(0.000)*** 
   18.23 
 (0.001)** 
40.38 
 (0.000)*** 
26.06 
 (0.000)*** 
  
    for Edu 
( Prob >   ) 
            18.08 
 (0.000)*** 
36.64 
 (0.000)*** 
20.26 
 (0.000)*** 
  
Notes: All regressions have a constant term. t-values are in parentheses. The financial market variables  refer to log of (  Bank credit / Bank Deposits) . Education variable refer to Education index (based on the adult literacy rate and the combined 
GER for primary, secondary and tertiary education)The inflation is log (1 + inflation rate). Trade volume is log ( exports + imports as a share of GDP). Government performance variables (Political Stability No Violence Government Effectiveness 
Control of Corruption), 
† if p < 0.10, * if p < 0.05; ** if p < 0.01; *** if p < 0.001. 
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           Table (9) heteroskedastic with cross-sectional correlation, with common AR(1)  FDI and growth  : Dependent variable—per capita growth rate. 
 Model 1 Without Interaction term    Model 2 with Interaction term = FD I   FM  Model 3 with Interaction term = FDI   FM  Edu 
Income Low  Upper middle High(OECD)    Low  Upper middle High(OECD)    Low  Upper middle High(OECD)   
FDI/GDP 0.135 
(2.44)* 
0.055 
(1.81)† 
0.049 
(3.40)**   
 0.310 
(3.25)** 
0.004 
(0.15) 
0.058 
(4.37)***   
 0.220 
(3.20)** 
-0.022 
(-0.81) 
0.060 
(4.52)*** 
  
Investment /GDP 0.152 
(4.91)*** 
0.363 
(19.32)*** 
0.138 
(7.96)***   
 0.144 
(4.57)*** 
0.327 
(17.12)*** 
0.131 
(6.88)***   
 0.138 
(4.57)*** 
0.292 
(13.16)*** 
0.131 
(6.92)*** 
  
Interaction term 
_____ _____ _____   
 0.318 
(2.25)* 
0.666 
(5.25)*** 
0.030 
(0.93)   
 0.743 
(2.06)* 
0.544 
(4.40)*** 
0.025 
(0.74) 
  
Financial market -0.014 
(-1.92)† 
-0.023 
(-6.10)*** 
-0.007 
(-2.28)*   
 -0.024 
(-2.78)** 
-0.054 
(-8.30)*** 
-0.008 
(-2.61)**   
 -0.026 
(-2.90)** 
-0.039 
(-7.13)*** 
-0.008 
(-2.51)* 
  
Education 0.037 
(1.87)† 
0.111 
(4.53)*** 
0.046 
(3.01)**   
 0.032 
(1.68)† 
0.088 
(4.04)*** 
0.049 
(3.08)**   
 0.052 
(2.57)* 
0.099 
(3.98)*** 
0.049 
(3.07)** 
  
Population Growth -1.019 
(-2.81)** 
-0.659 
(-8.55)*** 
-0.625 
(-7.92)***   
 -1.004 
(-2.69)** 
-0.658 
(-9.45)*** 
-0.662 
(-9.15)***   
 -0.842 
(-2.31)* 
-0.789 
(-10.00)*** 
-0.659 
(-9.11)*** 
  
Political Stability No Violence 0.005 
(1.51) 
0.019 
(5.38)*** 
0.005 
(3.11)**   
 0.006 
(1.55) 
0.023 
(6.75)*** 
0.005 
(2.78)**   
 0.003 
(0.94) 
0.005 
(1.75)† 
0.005 
(2.87)** 
  
Government Effectiveness 0.016 
(2.08)* 
-0.002 
(-0.44) 
0.013 
(4.52)***   
 0.014 
(1.93)† 
0.001 
(0.16) 
0.013 
(4.53)***   
 0.020 
(2.55)* 
0.010 
(2.71)** 
0.013 
(4.52)*** 
  
Control of Corruption -0.006 
(-0.91) 
-0.012 
(-3.54)*** 
-0.008 
(-2.70)**   
 -0.006 
(-0.79) 
-0.014 
(-4.14)*** 
-0.009 
(-3.54)***   
 -0.007 
(-1.07) 
-0.013 
(-2.96)** 
-0.009 
(-3.57)*** 
  
Trade volume 0.002 
(0.25) 
0.001 
(0.21) 
0.003 
(1.47)   
 0.001 
(0.11) 
0.004 
(1.27) 
0.003 
(1.77)†   
 -0.004 
(-0.54) 
0.005 
(2.23)* 
0.003 
(1.72)† 
  
Inflation -0.082 
(-4.18)*** 
-0.074 
(-4.14)*** 
-0.104 
(-5.78)***   
 -0.085 
(-4.14)*** 
-0.065 
(-3.75)*** 
-0.084 
(-5.60)***   
 -0.085 
(-4.39)*** 
-0.076 
(-4.25)*** 
-0.084 
(-5.59)*** 
  
Sub-Saharan Africa dummy 0.013 
(1.38) 
_____ _____ 
 
 
 0.015 
(1.66)† 
_____ _____ 
 
 
 0.012 
(1.29) 
_____ _____   
No of Obs 216 168 168    216 168 168    216 168 168   
No of countries 18 14 14    18 14 14    18 14 14   
Wald      
( Prob >   ) 
125.57  
(0.000)*** 
1015.92  
(0.000)*** 
401.69  
(0.000)*** 
   126.62  
(0.000)*** 
1301.51  
(0.000)*** 
378.30  
(0.000)*** 
   127.09 
 (0.000)*** 
927.99 
 (0.000)*** 
382.87 
 (0.000)*** 
  
    for FDI 
 ( Prob >   ) 
      10.90  
(0.004)** 
31.86  
(0.000)*** 
48.65  
(0.000)*** 
   10.26 
 (0.005)** 
19.55  
(0.000)*** 
49.66  
(0.000)*** 
  
    for FM 
( Prob >   ) 
      8.35  
(0.01)* 
83.16  
(0.000)*** 
7.02 
(0.02)* 
   8.51  
(0.01)* 
57.40  
(0.000)*** 
6.73  
(0.03)* 
  
    for Edu 
( Prob >   ) 
            8.49 
 (0.01)* 
38.91  
(0.000)*** 
9.58  
(0.008)** 
  
Notes: All regressions have a constant term. t-values are in parentheses. The financial market variables  refer to log of (  Bank credit / Bank Deposits) . Education variable refer to Education index (based on the adult literacy rate and the combined 
GER for primary, secondary and tertiary education)The inflation is log (1 + inflation rate). Trade volume is log ( exports + imports as a share of GDP). Government performance variables (Political Stability No Violence Government Effectiveness 
Control of Corruption), 
† if p < 0.10, * if p < 0.05; ** if p < 0.01; *** if p < 0.001 
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FDI , employment and Poverty alleviation  
 
Granger Causality Test using Panel Data 
 
Employment is ideal to measure the impact of FDI on poverty ―many of the poor blame their income 
shortfall on their joblessness‖.  In this section, the findings of Granger causality tests on the 
relationship between FDI  and employment  across 62 countries for the period 1997-2007 were 
reported.  
One of the fundamental problems inherent in literature  is that, to date, no specific causality analysis of 
the mutual relationship between FDI and employment has been conducted. The reason is that 
sufficiently long time series necessary for using Granger causality tests are not available. However, 
recent theoretical developments in Granger causality methods have made tests using relatively short 
time series possible through the use of panel data approach
17, adapting the methodology proposed by 
(Larrain et al., 1997; Hurlin and Venet, 2001 Robert et al,2005) and recently applied by Erdil and 
Yetkiner (2008). 
FDI inflow measures the amount of FDI entering a country during one year period, while the FDI 
stock emphasizes the monetary dimension of FDI which is the total amount of productive capacity 
owned by foreign affiliates in the host country.  It grows over time and includes all retained earnings 
of foreign-owned firms held in cash and investments.  Therefore,  I have decided to use FDI stock 
inflow/GDP instead of FDI/GDP as FDI stock associated with production and production is associated 
with employment. The paper tested for Granger causality between two variables : FDI, measured by 
FDI stock inflow/GDP and employment, proxied by different measure :  First, total employment to 
population ; Second, female employment over 15 year and third, male employment over 15 years.  All 
data are expressed in logarithms in order to include the proliferative effect of time series.   
                                                          
17
 As using micro-panels, where there are large numbers of cross-section units and small numbers of time series observations, the FE 
estimator of the coefficients of lagged endogenous variables is biased and inconsistent Nickell, (1981). On the other hand, the ML 
estimators for the dynamic fixed effects models remain biased with the introduction of exogenous variables when T is small Hurlin and 
Venet,( 2001). Moreover, Kiviet (1995) also provides an analytical expression for this bias. However, Nickell, (1981) demonstrates a fall in 
the size of bias on the coefficients of lagged endogenous variables with the presence of exogenous regressors. Furthermore, Judson and 
Owen (1999) provide Monte Carlo evidence and show that the FE estimator’s bias decreases with T. Thus, for our case, we have decided to 
use the FE estimator since the bias is not large  and the available literature does also show evidence in favor of fixed effects models for 
similar cases. 
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FDI stock inflow/GDP data come from : UNCTAD 2009 FDI database, and employment data come 
from  Gender Info
18
 2007 database.  
Consider a time-stationary VAR representation, adapted to a panel data context. For each individual   I 
have           : 
         
         
 
   
            
 
   
                         
         
         
 
   
            
 
   
                     
With         and                    and                  where         and        are i.i.d (0 ,  
 ) , 
i.i.d ( 0 ,  
  ), respectively.  
First step : The hypotheses to be tested are the homogenous non-causality hypotheses, given 
by: 
     
                            
                                                       
            
     
                           
                                                       
            
In the general case, the test statistics can be computed by the following Wald test proposed by 
Hurlin and Venet (2001) 
      
                  
                 
 
where SN denotes the total number of observations,      stands for the restricted sum of 
squared residuals obtained under   , whereas      is unrestricted sum of squared residual 
computed from equations 4 and 5. This procedure also follows a standard Granger causality 
assumption where the variables entered into the system need to be time-stationary. Thus, the 
two variables are subjected to Levin, Lin and Chu (2002) unit root testing. 
                                                          
18
 Gender Info 2007 is a global database of gender statistics and indicators on a wide range of policy areas, including: population, families, 
health, education, work, and political participation It is an initiative of the United Nations Statistics Division, produced in collaboration with 
the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA). 
For equation (4) 
For equation (5) 
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Table 10  reports unit root test for the level of FDI and employment, the unit root test statistics 
are significant at the 5% level, for all sub-groups and overall samples. 
Table10 Combined results of the panel unit root tests for FDI Stock and Employment 
 in there levels using  Levin, Lin and Chu (2002) 
Country / Variable FDI Stock /GDP 
Employment to population 
Total Female(15+year)  Male(15+year)  
All country -15.99 *** -9.60 *** -12.37***  -8.86***  
OECD
a 
-2.65** -2.12* -2.26*  -3.05**  
Non OECD
b
  -21.23*** -12.97*** -10.58***  -8.25***  
a.FDI exporter b.FDI importer 
† if p < 0.10, * if p < 0.05; ** if p < 0.01; *** if p < 0.001 
 
Given these results, I ought to use stationary original level  variables for conducting the Granger 
causality analysis. The causality relationships between two variables are subject to investigation. I 
computed the panel data VAR (equation 4,5) with the usual FE estimator, the Fhnc statistics are 
reported in Table 11. 
Table11. Granger causality analysis of FDI and employment 
Category 
FDI> 
EMP 
EMP> 
FDI 
FDI> 
FEM15 
FEM15> 
FDI 
FDI> 
MAL15 
MAL15> 
FDI 
 
All country 12.67*** 0.48 4.59* 0.06 0.59 0.24  
OECD
a 
0.25 0.64 0.17 1.06 7.09** 0.05  
Non OECD
b
  13.49*** 2.04 4.64* 0.25 0.05 0.33  
                a.FDI exporter, b.FDI importer 
               † if p < 0.10, * if p < 0.05; ** if p < 0.01; *** if p < 0.001 
 
To investigate the contemporaneous relationships between FDI and employment, I fitted the 
conventional panel data models. First, for all countries, FDI = f (Emp), FDI = f(Empfem15), second 
for Non OECD countries, FDI = f (Emp), FDI = f (Empfem15) and finally, for OECD countries (FDI 
exporter) FDI = f (Empmal15).  I selected the estimator fixed or random effects using two diagnostic 
statistics : Hausman (H) test statistics  and Lagrange Multiplier (LM). The results are given in Table 
12. 
Collectively, all models revealed a reasonable overall fit. For the Non OECD countries, a positive 
significant coefficient of FDI is computed implying that FDI creates more jobs. FDI Granger Cause 
employment in Non OECD countries (FDI Importer). Interestingly, FDI Granger cause female 
employment and this confirms our believe regarding the relation between FDI and poverty reduction, 
since they indicate that FDI appears regularly to be a key source of employment for women in 
developing countries. With this, Jenkins and Thomas  (2002) stress that the implications for poverty 
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alleviation are important.  Cotton and Ramachandran ( 2001) give the reason for this, based on their 
research, which has shown that the earnings of women are most often allocated to improving the 
health and nutritional well-being of their children, and any increase in women‘s employment and/or 
increases in their wages are likely to improve the quality of life in households where women work. 
This goes hand in hand with  Barro-Becker (1989) and  Becker, Murphy and Tamura (1990).  
Table(12) Contemporaneous relationships between FDI and employment 
Category  Diagnostic tests Constant Coefficient R2 
All Countries 
 
FDI >  
Employment 
 
 
 
 
H: 
 
 
43.98*** 
 
 
0.025 
 
 
0.004 
 
 
W: 
 
 
0.77 
LM: 28.08*** (6.41)*** (3.56)*** B : 0.99 
    O: 0.99 
FDI >  
Emp Fem 15+ 
 
H: 80.17*** 0. 031 0.003 W: 0.77 
LM: 62.42*** (9.56)*** (2.14)* B : 0.99 
    O : 0.99 
Non OECD Countries 
 
FDI >  
Employment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
H: 32.52*** 0.023 0.005 W: 0.76 
LM: 14.72*** (4.79)*** (3.67)*** B : 0.99 
    O : 0.99 
 
FDI >  
Emp Fem 15+ 
 
      
H: 62.78*** 0.032 0.004 W: 0.74 
LM: 39.54*** (8.12)*** (2.15)* B : 0.99 
    O : 0.99 
OECD Countries 
 
FDI >  
Emp Mal 15 
      
H: 31.33*** 0.052 -0.006 W: 0.75 
LM: 14.17*** (5.98)*** (-2.66)** B : 0.99 
    O : 0.98 
H = Hausman test : LM = Lagrange Multiplier : W = within : B= Between : O = Overall  
† if p < 0.10, * if p < 0.05; ** if p < 0.01; *** if p < 0.001 
One could argue that the reason that FDI appears significant and Granger causality for employment  in 
the above mentioned analysis, this is because we are considering FDI the only engine for job creation 
which is not true because we are assuming that FDI inflows is accompanied by direct effect on  
employment opportunities creation, also indirect effect, by promoting both forward and backward 
production linkages with domestic sectors and foreign firms, for instance via subcontracting systems. 
My believes and analysis results are goes hand in hand with Aaron (1999) who states that likely FDI 
was directly responsible for  creating 26 million jobs in 1997. Estimates of the indirect employment 
effect of FDI vary widely around a multiplier of 1.6 (i.e. 1.6 indirect jobs for every one direct job) 
therefore, it can be argued that the indirect effect of FDI on employment and poverty reduction is  
higher than direct effect.  
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Table 12 report other interesting results, OECD countries FDI Granger Cause male employment 
opportunity in opposite way (negative and significant). The interpretation is that FDI outflows from 
OECD countries lead to job losses in the source countries.  Papaconstantinou (1996) argues that US 
FDI outflows have been found to cause job losses in the US . 
5. conclusion  and comments 
 
Recently, FDI becomes one of the few ways in which low level income countries can access capital 
for development and poverty alleviation. But in the meanwhile, policy makers need to monitor trends 
carefully and accordingly adapt financial market policy and business environment. 
This paper focused, in particular, on FDI and the impact of its interaction with local financial markets 
and human development (proxied by education) on real growth rate per capita. I believe that FDI is in 
itself no panacea, but if interacted with monetary and  nonmonetary variables will provide  a favorable 
effect on poverty reduction  in the host country. 
The lack of buildup human knowledge and development of local financial markets, in particular, can 
adversely limit an economy‘s ability to absorb the benefits associated with FDI. Whereas, 
undeveloped  financial markets may mean that a country is not in a position to cope with direct 
investment inflow. In this paper, the empirical evidence suggests that FDI appears regularly to be a 
key source of employment specially for women in Non OECD countries .  
6. Details and Descriptive statistics  
  
List Countries in the samples: Austria, Canada, Switzerland, Czech Republic Germany, Denmark, 
Spain, Finland, United Kingdom, Greece, Hungry, Iceland, Italy, New Zealand, Benin,  Burkina Faso, 
Central African Republic, Côte d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Kyrgyz Republic, Cambodia, Gambia, 
Mozambique,  Niger, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo,  Tanzania, Zambia, 
Haiti, Vietnam, Argentina, Belize, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Croatia,  Jamaica, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, 
Latvia, Malaysia, Panama ,Poland,  Uruguay and South Africa. 
Sample 1: 14 Countries (OECD) High Income level 
Austria, Canada, Switzerland, Czech Republic Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, United Kingdom, 
Greece, Hungry, Iceland, Italy and New Zealand  
Sample 1: 19 Countries (Low income level ) 
Benin, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Côte d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Kyrgyz Republic, Cambodia, 
Gambia, Mozambique,  Niger, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo,  Tanzania, 
Zambia, Haiti and Vietnam. 
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Sample 1:15 Countries (Upper Middle income) 
Argentina, Belize, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Croatia, Jamaica, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Latvia, 
Malaysia, Panama, Poland,  Uruguay and South Africa. 
6.2  Descriptive statistics 
Table 13                                                        
 Mean S.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Sample 1: 14 Countries (OECD) High Income level N = 168 
1.Growth 0.03 0.02          
2.FDI/GDP 0.04 0.04 0.19*         
3. BCBD 1.33 0.60 -0.17* 0.10        
4. Education 0.95 0.03 0.00 0.08 0.47*       
5. Population Growth 0.01 0.01 -0.18* 0.14 0.21* 0.14      
6. Political Stability No Violence 1.01 0.37 0.08 0.21* 0.31* 0.38* 0.15*     
7. Government Effectiveness 1.62 0.55 -0.05 0.08 0.45* 0.60* 0.31* 0.72*    
8. Control of Corruption 1.61 0.74 -0.08 0.09 0.49* 0.68* 0.30* 0.74* 0.95*   
9. Trade volume 0.74 0.27 0.24* 0.39* -0.18* -0.12 -0.27* 0.16* -0.14 -0.18*  
10. Inflation 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.20* -0.18* -0.36* -0.10 -0.26* -0.44* -0.40* 0.24* 
Sample 1: 19 Countries (Low income level ) N = 228 
1.Growth 0.02 0.04          
2.FDI/GDP 0.03 0.03 0.21*         
3. BCBD 0.77 0.38 -0.01 -0.11        
4. Education 0.41 0.25 0.20* 0.15* 0.32*       
5. Population Growth 0.03 0.01 -0.11 -0.05 -0.23* -0.66*      
6. Political Stability No Violence -0.57 0.73 0.20* 0.23* 0.04 -0.07 0.24*     
7. Government Effectiveness -0.78 0.40 0.24* 0.19* 0.12 0.12 0.05 0.60*    
8. Control of Corruption -0.79 0.38 0.12 0.13* 0.17* -0.17* 0.25* 0.56* 0.62*   
9. Trade volume 0.70 0.31 0.16* 0.43* 0.11 0.39* -0.32* 0.19* 0.26* 0.05  
10. Inflation 0.08 0.09 -0.04 0.11 -0.27* 0.23* -0.21* -0.12 -0.02 -0.19* 0.02 
Sample 1:15 Countries (Upper Middle income)  N = 180 
1.Growth 0.04 0.04          
2.FDI/GDP 0.05 0.03 0.21*         
3. BCBD 1.04 0.36 0.15 0.05        
4. Education 0.87 0.07 0.42* 0.02 0.06       
5. Population Growth 0.01 0.01 -0.34* -0.05 0.13 -0.64*      
6. Political Stability No Violence 0.26 0.43 0.26* 0.04 0.33* 0.30* -0.03     
7. Government Effectiveness 0.31 0.48 0.01 -0.19* 0.29* 0.10 0.07 0.40*    
8. Control of Corruption 0.13 0.56 -0.10 -0.24* 0.29* 0.07 0.13 0.49* 0.88*   
9. Trade volume 0.89 0.45 0.25* 0.36* 0.23* -0.16* 0.09 0.28* 0.12 -0.08  
10. Inflation 0.07 0.07 -0.02 -0.06 -0.03 0.15* -0.16* -0.18* -0.33* -0.16* -0.14 
b.Correlations reported are for the main effects, and not for the interaction terms.      
*p< 0.05. 
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